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EMPLOYER ORGANIZATION AND THE
LAW: AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
KATHLEEN THELEN*
I
INTRODUCTION
In the literature on political economy and historical sociology, American
exceptionalism has typically been framed as a question of why American labor
unions appeared so weak and so conservative compared to their European
counterparts. The usual answers point to American political culture,1
characteristics of the working class,2 features of American political parties or the
party system,3 or aspects of the American state.4 However, by posing the question
as an inquiry into what is different about American labor, scholars have
overlooked the possibility that what is exceptional about the United States may
have more to do with the distinctive features of American employers rather than
of its unions or its working class.
This Article attempts to fill that gap by bringing a comparative perspective to
bear on an underexplored aspect of American exceptionalism: the peculiar
features of American employers and the legal framework regulating firm
competition in which they historically developed. A large literature on rich
democracies demonstrates that the structure and organizational capacities of
employers are critical to the operation of the political economy. The dominant
literature on varieties of capitalism draws a broad distinction between the liberal
market economies of Anglo-Saxon countries and the coordinated market
economies of Europe, a difference rooted in the capacity of employers to
coordinate amongst themselves (and with unions) to achieve joint economic gains
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1. See, e.g., LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955); SEYMOUR MARTIN
LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 100–01 (1996).
2. See, e.g., WERNER SOMBART, WARUM GIBT ES IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN KEINEN
SOZIALISMUS? (1906); KIM VOSS, THE MAKING OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 1–2 (1993)
(chronicling the labor movements started by craft workers and less skilled laborers).
3. See, e.g., BARRY EIDLIN, LABOR AND THE CLASS IDEA IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
10–14 (2018).
4. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 1, 7–
9 (1991); VICTORIA HATTAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER 3 (1993).
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through cooperation.5 While Europe’s coordinated model is as successful in
economic terms as the alternative liberal model, it has traditionally been
associated with significantly lower levels of income inequality and greater social
solidarity.6 A high level of employer organization is crucial to the success of this
model: strong employer associations are critical partners in encompassing
collective bargaining, which can set limits on cutthroat strategies based on wage
competition.7 Employer organization also allows firms to cooperate on other
issues such as training that support the kind of high wage, high quality, and high
value-added strategies that are more characteristic of Europe’s “socially
embedded” variety of capitalism.8
In the comparative literature, the United States is seen as the paradigmatic
liberal market economy.9 While U.S. employers have developed powerful
lobbying organizations (for example, the Business Roundtable and the Chamber
of Commerce), they lack the kind of strong, centralized trade and employer
associations that allow employers in Europe to cooperate with each other and
with unions in ways that support more egalitarian outcomes.10
The distinctiveness of American employer organization is best highlighted
with reference to developments elsewhere. My analysis will focus on a
comparison of the United States and Germany. Just as the United States has been
seen as the quintessential liberal market economy, Germany has long been
considered the paradigmatic coordinated model.11 The United States is
characterized by weak employer associations and low capacity for strategic
coordination in the market. In contrast, Germany exemplifies the socially
embedded variety of capitalism, featuring higher levels of employer coordination
and more cooperative engagement with strong and centralized industrial unions
who play an important role in the management of the economy and even of
individual firms.
The purpose of this Article is to elucidate the role of the law in shaping the
U.S. and German models of employer organization and their respective market
economies. Specifically, I zero in on legislative and legal developments in the late

5. Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF
CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1, 8–9 (Peter A.
Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
6. For some comparisons see, for example, Kathleen Thelen, The American Precariat: U.S.
Capitalism in Comparative Perspective, 17 PERSP. ON POL. 5, 5 (2019).
7. Id. at 17–18, 23 n.68.
8. Wolfgang Streeck, On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production, in BEYOND
KEYNESIANISM: THE SOCIO-ECONOMICS OF PRODUCTION AND FULL EMPLOYMENT 21, 26–27 (Egon
Matzner & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1991).
9. See, e.g., Hall & Soskice, supra note 5, at 27–33 (using the United States to illustrate the
distinctive features of liberal market economies generally).
10. See id. at 27 (discussing how U.S. employers rely on market mechanisms to coordinate rather
than coordinating through institutions such as trade associations and employer organizations—as is more
common in coordinated market economies).
11. See id. at 21–27 (using the German case to illustrate the defining features of coordinated
economies generally).
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nineteenth century to document the impact they had on the organization, goals,
and strategies of American employers, and, with that, on the political-economic
architecture of contemporary American capitalism as a whole. In Part II, I discuss
in more depth the importance of a comparative historical perspective. Part III
describes the impact of U.S. competition policy of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries on employer organization and strategies. Part IV provides,
by contrast, the differing developments in Germany during the same period that
contributed to its coordinated market economy. I conclude in Part V by exploring
how these historical events shaped the modern market economies of these two
countries.
II
THE UNITED STATES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
A crucial difference between developments in Europe and the United
States—unexplored in the literature on the varieties of capitalism—concerns the
impact of differences in the legal regimes governing competition policy in the late
nineteenth century. The literature on competition policy in this period focuses
heavily on the large trusts and cartels that emerged at that time. However, to
understand the importance of these different competition regimes for labor
politics, we need to direct our attention instead to their impact on the smaller,
skill-intensive batch producers who were at the center of early industrialization
and whose skilled workers formed the core of early union movements
everywhere.
The legal framework in Europe’s coordinated model allowed the strongest
and most competitive of such firms to spearhead the construction of strong
coordinating capacities, not so much to confront unions but to discipline marginal
producers engaged in ruinous, cutthroat competition.12 In the United States, by
contrast, the very different rules governing competition allowed marginal firms
to shape the terms of the emerging labor regime, as low-quality producers were
able to turn to the courts to assist them in dismantling nascent forms of
coordination that posed a threat to their survival.13 Where employers could
defeat unions in court, they had little need to coordinate among themselves in
the market, since the efforts of even small numbers of players—winning key
judicial decisions—resonated widely and affected all actors subject to the
prevailing regulatory regime. The kinds of marginal, lower-cost firms that
prevailed in these contests could then rely on the discipline of the market to bring
other firms in line.
Comparing the United States and Germany is fruitful and revealing
because—contrary to many popular accounts—the two countries shared some

12. See, e.g., GARY HERRIGEL, INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTIONS: THE SOURCES OF GERMAN
INDUSTRIAL POWER 60–61 (1996) (detailing how economic turbulence spurred the creation of collective
governance mechanisms in Germany’s southwestern states).
13. See infra notes 111 & 120.

FINAL - THELEN (DO NOT DELETE)

26

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

6/26/2020 4:04 PM

[Vol. 83:23

strikingly similar characteristics at the end of the nineteenth century.14 For
example, it is commonly asserted that American unions faced an unusually
inhospitable political landscape, and it is certainly true that they confronted
hostile employers as well as a highly complicit state.15 However, it is not clear that
the United States stood out in this regard. Early unions in most other countries
had to confront explicit anti-combination laws, and governments—often, as in
Germany, authoritarian governments—did not hesitate to harass unions and
intervene in industrial conflicts.16 At the end of the nineteenth century,
unionization rates in Germany and the United States were nearly identical at
about five percent.17
Other scholars emphasize the impact of Germany’s late industrialization (and
associated industrial and union concentration) versus the United States’ early,
more gradual and decentralized, industrialization.18 However, these differences,
too, are frequently overblown. In fact, the United States and Germany both
began to industrialize with small-scale and decentralized production in the early
to mid-nineteenth century, and in both cases industrial growth later centered on
key infrastructural industries like steel and electrical machinery, many of which
were dominated by a small number of players.19 Industrial employment in the two
countries in the early twentieth century was broadly similar, accounting for about
a third of total employment, with employment in agriculture accounting for
another third.20
Moreover, while much has been made of differences in the sizes of the
domestic markets, this observation also needs to be qualified. First of all, the size
of the national market was not an issue for the leading firms in either country;
these leading firms were in fact heavily involved, and indeed dominating forces,
in key world markets—steel and electrical manufacturing, as well as chemicals
for Germany and oil for the United States.21 More generally, Germany had
consolidated its internal market well before the country’s unification in 1870,
while in the United States many obstacles to a truly uniform domestic market

14. See Colleen A. Dunlavy & Thomas Welskopp, Myths and Peculiarities: Comparing U.S. and
German Capitalism, 41 GERMAN HIST. INST. BULL. 33, 35 (2007) (“When trends in the two countries are
set side by side . . . the differences that these stories imply between the American and German styles of
capitalism at the turn of the century turn out to be much smaller than imagined.”).
15. See, e.g., FORBATH, supra note 4, at 59–97 (analyzing the use of the injunction in labor disputes).
16. See Klaus Schönhoven, Gewerkschaftliches Organisationsverhalten im Wilhelminischen
Deutschland, in ARBEITER IM INDUSTRIALISIERUNGSPROZEß 403, 414–15 (Werner Conze & Ulrich
Engelhardt eds., 1979).
17. Dunlavy & Welskopp, supra note 14, at 42.
18. See, e.g., ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE: A BOOK OF ESSAYS (1962).
19. The steel industry was dominated by U.S. Steel in the United States and Krupp in Germany
while the electrical machinery industry was dominated by GE and Westinghouse in the United States
and Siemens and AEG in Germany. Dunlavy & Welskopp, supra note 14, at 35–36.
20. Id. at 36–37.
21. Id. at 35–36.
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persisted until the closing decades of the nineteenth century.22 One main obstacle
in the United States was that state governments retained considerable power to
establish independent economic policies and distinct corporate legal regimes.23
While frequently exaggerating those differences, the literature has mostly
overlooked a much more striking difference between the two countries: the way
in which state policy in the late nineteenth century dealt with issues of
competition and inter-firm cooperation. The literature on this subject that does
exist focuses—understandably—on the big U.S. trusts and the large German
cartels that emerged in this period.24 Less well-covered is what was happening
among small proprietary capitalists engaged in decentralized production and
heavily reliant on skilled labor.25 In Germany, the most competitive of such firms
in the late nineteenth century were organizing among themselves to mitigate
their own potential ruinous competition by developing governance institutions
through which to socialize risk in the face of market volatility.26 As elaborated
below, similar arrangements emerged in the United States at this time. The
difference is that these arrangements did not survive in the United States. I argue
that state policy, as interpreted by the courts, played a key role in undermining
nascent forms of coordination that flourished in Europe and that would later
provide an associational infrastructure that proved more congenial to the
emergence of a coordinated and social variety of capitalism.
A. The Context—Economic and Legal
The closing years of the nineteenth century were a period of considerable
economic tumult in the United States and Europe alike. Advances in
communication and transportation had upset previously stable local markets by
exposing firms to intensified competition from producers in other parts of the
country and from abroad. A major financial crisis in 1873 triggered a severe
economic downturn that enveloped Europe and North America and ushered in
two decades of economic stagnation known as the “Long Depression.”27 These
developments brought an abrupt end to the post-Civil War boom in the United
States and shook the newly unified German state to its core.28
In both countries, manufacturing was hit especially hard. Overcapacity across
key markets caused wages and profits to plummet, setting in motion vicious
22. Id. at 47–49.
23. Id. at 46–49.
24. For a review of the literature on cartels, see, for example, Jeffrey Fear, Cartels, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS HISTORY 268, 268–92 (Geoffrey Jones & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2008).
25. Gary Herrigel is an exception to this, and his work has deeply influenced my thinking. See
HERRIGEL, supra note 12, at 33–71.
26. See generally id.
27. Thomas Klitgaard & James Narron, Crisis Chronicles: The Long Depression and the Panic of
1873, LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Feb. 5, 2016), https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/02/crisischronicles-the-long-depression-and-the-panic-of-1873.html [https://perma.cc/Q924-E4HN].
28. See id.; Donald Sassoon, To Understand This Crisis We Can Look to the Long Depression Too,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/29/long-depressioncrashes-capitalism-history [https://perma.cc/NDB8-2K93].
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cutthroat competition amongst firms and provoking considerable industrial
strife. In this context, firms in many industries sought to stabilize prices by
banding together into arrangements to protect themselves against this destructive
competition. This was the context that produced the great trusts in the United
States and the cartels in Germany that tend to dominate the scholarly accounts
of this period.29 Firms in both countries—particularly those in capital-intensive
industries that relied heavily on unskilled labor—forged new arrangements to
seize control of large market shares in a period of extreme economic turbulence.30
These trusts and large autarkic cartels could alleviate the competitive pressures
they faced either through hierarchy (for example, U.S. trusts and mergers) or
internal contracting (Germany’s “Interessengemeinschaften,” or “communities of
interest”).31
Similar strategies were either not available or not attractive to smaller scale,
decentralized manufacturers who engaged in more specialized batch production
and relied heavily on skilled labor. For these producers, coordination—for
example, through robust trade associations—could provide relief from market
turbulence. However, purely voluntary cooperation is notoriously fragile,
particularly in periods of intense and destructive competition when the incentives
to engage in opportunistic behavior are almost irresistible. In these
circumstances, leading firms often found it in their interest to accept—in some
cases, actively enlist—the assistance of unions to help them enforce compliance.32
Thus, especially in skill-intensive industries dominated by small and mediumsized firms, alternative forms of coordination frequently emerged in which
employers organized among themselves to stabilize competition and sometimes
turned to unions to police these arrangements by punishing firms engaged in
cutthroat competition based on wage chiseling.33 In such cases, cooperation with
organized labor “held out the promise of comfortable profits for employers and
wages for employees—a peaceable kingdom erected on the industrywide
collective bargaining agreement.”34

29. See, e.g., J. SINGER, DAS LAND DER MONOPOLE: AMERIKA ODER DEUTSCHLAND? (1913).
30. Space does not permit a full discussion of the quite different forms these arrangements took in
the two countries. Trusts were a distinctly American innovation, one that responded to the specific
incentives and constraints of the American political economy and antitrust regime. German cartels were
less hierarchically organized because they were based on contracts that were legally enforceable. See
PAUL FELIX ASHROTT, DIE AMERIKANISCHEN TRUSTS ALS WEITERBILDUNG DES
UNTERNEHMERVERBÄNDE 2 (1889).
31. Id.
32. See PETER SWENSON, CAPITALISTS AGAINST MARKETS: THE MAKING OF LABOR MARKETS
AND WELFARE STATES IN THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN 122–24 (2002).
33. See id. at 63 (defining chiseling as “low-price competition made possible by imprudent and
shabby practices”).
34. DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE
LIBERALISM 5 (1995).
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B. Diverging Legal Regimes
In both Germany and the United States, proprietary capitalists engaged in
labor- and skill-intensive manufacturing experimented with new organizational
forms to confront the turbulent markets of the late nineteenth century. In the
United States, such experiments devolved into an all-out war against organized
labor.35 In Germany, the cooperative arrangements that they organized formed
the basis of powerful trade associations that stabilized Germany’s vaunted
industrial middle class.36 This made it possible for the German trade associations
to make peace with the skilled workers on whose contributions their production
model relied. The different fates of these experiments and new organizational
arrangements in the late nineteenth century turned on the responses of the state
and courts.
The key antitrust legislation in the United States was the Sherman Act of
1890.37 The context that produced this law was widespread public concern about
the growing concentration of economic power in the American political
economy. Americans watched with alarm as Standard Oil assumed control of
much of the country’s oil refining and as new trusts cropped up in other, more
consumer-facing, industries, such as sugar and whisky.38
Even as the public clamored for an antitrust statute, the legal and scholarly
communities were divided on the issue.39 The American Economic Association’s
first meeting, in 1885, took up the question gingerly.40 While some delegates
warned of the hazards of rampant competition and growing concentration in the
hands of the powerful, most were loath to endorse state intervention of any sort,
lest they be branded “socialist.”41 The legal community—still steeped in British
common law tradition—believed that many of the emerging market behaviors
should be prohibited, but thought that the solution lay not in further legislation
but rather in the vigorous enforcement of existing common law.42
Elected politicians were apparently less conflicted, as the Sherman Act sailed
through Congress nearly unanimously.43 Though wildly popular in Congress, the
resulting legislation was famously ambiguous, and it would largely fall to the
courts to resolve those ambiguities.44 The results of the early years of its

35. See id.
36. HERRIGEL, supra note 12, at 20.
37. WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 3 (1965).
38. Id. at 69–70.
39. Id. at 76–78.
40. See id. at 71–72 (“Following a long debate the [Association’s] platform was finally revised, and
the new version omitted the explicit denunciation [of the laissez-faire doctrine allowing trusts to form at
will.]”).
41. Id. at 72.
42. See id. at 77–85.
43. Id. at 95.
44. Among the matters left unclarified was whether labor was meant to be exempted. See LETWIN,
supra note 37, at 97–98.
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enforcement were thus highly uneven. “Loose” or horizontal combinations—
arrangements between independent firms or individuals—were held to be per se
illegal, for the common law had long prohibited such behaviors as constituting a
restraint of trade.45 By contrast, combinations formed by trust or merger were
treated differently: the Court required proof “that the ‘evident purpose’ of the
combination was to restrain trade.”46 Richard Posner’s analysis documents that
in the first two decades after the Sherman Act was passed, 50 of the 61 antitrust
cases brought by the Department of Justice involved horizontal combinations or
conspiracies.47
Germany went in a markedly different direction in the late nineteenth
century, legalizing cartels and also expressly sanctioning other forms of collective
self-help among independent firms. Although Germany later came to be known
as the “country of the cartels,”48 in fact before the country’s unification in 1870,
leading German states had embraced a more laissez-faire model of economic
growth.49 However, these views quickly fell out of favor in the so-called
Gründerkrise, the economic crisis that rocked the country in the first years of its
existence after 1870 and that inspired a search for alternatives to liberalism as
developmental model.50
Social scientists and the legal community were crucial in steering Germany
toward an alternative, organized, market ideology.51 Economic policy in this
period was shaped especially by the Verein für Socialpolitik (Verein), an
organization of economists and legal scholars that enjoyed privileged access to
the German bureaucracy by virtue of its influential research on pressing
contemporary social and economic issues.52 Formed in 1873, the Verein provided
an institutional bridge between political economy and legal science in support of
an alternative to liberals or socialists.53 The organization’s guiding principle was
that of a managed market—one in which competition would be organized and
moderated. Given this orientation, the Verein viewed emerging efforts at

45. NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895–
1904, at 174 (1985).
46. Id.
47. Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 366 tbl.1,
396 tbl.22 (1970).
48. Knut Wolfgang Nörr, Law and Market Organization: The Historical Experience in Germany
from 1900 to the Law Against Restraints of Competition (1957), 151 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
ECON. 5 (1995).
49. Gerhard Lehmbruch, The Institutional Embedding of Market Economies: The German “Model”
and Its Impact on Japan, in THE ORIGINS OF NONLIBERAL CAPITALISM: GERMANY AND JAPAN IN
COMPARISON 39, 48–49 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kozo Yamamura eds., 2001).
50. Id. at 50–51.
51. See Nörr, supra note 48, at 5 (“Both [political economy and legal science] were linked
institutionally as well, particularly in the famous ‘Verein für Socialpolitik’ . . . which came to be the
opinion leader of the Bismarck-Wilhelmian Empire and embodied, as it were, the nation’s social
conscience in those decades.”).
52. Id.
53. See Lehmbruch, supra note 49, at 55 (discussing the ideology of the Verein).

FINAL - THELEN (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2020]

EMPLOYER ORGANIZATION AND THE LAW

6/26/2020 4:04 PM

31

employer coordination in an overall sanguine light.54 Indeed, the first German
study of the impact of cartels, by the economist Friedrich Kleinwächter in 1879,
held Manchester liberalism responsible for the economic crisis and characterized
cartels approvingly as a defense against excessive competition.55
Kleinwächter was not alone. A chorus of economists viewed cartels as
representing a more advanced state of economic development.56 Economic
sociologist Albert Schäffle penned an influential essay in 1898 entitled “Zum
Kartellwesen und zur Kartellpolitik” [“On the Nature of Cartels and Cartel
Policy”] that painted a “bleak picture” of the free market as “a wild war of all
against all,” waged with the most deceitful tools and resulting in “evil
consequences.”57
In sharp contrast to the confusion and wrangling within the U.S. legal
profession as to the proper bounds of the Sherman Act in this period,58 there was
a rather high degree of consensus in the German legal community on this matter.
The influential Juristentag, a national association of legal scholars and
practitioners, explicitly endorsed cartels and the role of the courts in sanctioning
these organizational forms and contributing to their stabilization.59 The dominant
view at the association’s 1902 and 1904 congresses opposed legislation that would
suppress cartels.60 Delegates certainly discussed the possible negative impact of
cartels and their need to be monitored and regulated.61 However, rather than ban
the cartels, the delegates’ prevailing view was that the state should recognize
them in order to facilitate such oversight.62 Insofar as cartels were viewed as a
national response to destructive competition, supporting and monitoring them
was the best defense against such abuse.63
In these debates, speakers invoked the United States as a negative model.
Thus, for example, at the 1905 convention of the Verein, economist and legal
scholar Gustav Schmoller characterized the American case as a cautionary tale.64
Schmoller, who as Chairman of the Verein had exercised outsized influence in
the German political economy since the 1870s, delivered an extended defense of
German cartels that bordered on rapturous.65 According to Schmoller,
54. KLAUS RICHTER, DIE WIRKUNGSGESCHICHTE DES DEUTSCHEN KARTELLRECHTS VOR 1914,
at 105–06 (2007).
55. See generally FRIEDRICH KLEINWÄCHTER, DIE KARTELLE: EIN BEITRAG ZUR FRAGE DER
ORGANISATION DER VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT (1879); see also RICHTER, supra note 54, at 55–56.
56. RICHTER, supra note 54, at 98.
57. Id. at 188.
58. See LETWIN, supra note 37, at 143–81 (detailing the legal wrangling that produced rulings that
were almost equally split as to the bounds of the Sherman Act, and in which more than one opinion was
submitted on both concurring and dissenting sides).
59. See Nörr, supra note 48, at 6–7.
60. See RICHTER, supra note 54, at 201–07.
61. Id. at 201.
62. Id. at 206.
63. Id. at 201–02.
64. Id. at 207–10.
65. Id.; Nörr, supra note 48, at 7–8.
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cooperative cartels of the sort that had been cropping up all across Germany were
not only benign, they were also ethical because they looked out for the collective
interests of both their member firms and their workers.66 As such, they guarded
against the short-sighted opportunism that was rampant in the United States.67
Schmoller argued that the U.S. trusts were founded by egoistic money grubbers
out for private gain, while the founders of cartels were “educators who want[ed]
to secure the victory of the collective interest of a branch of trade over the egoistic
interests of individuals.”68
The next Parts sketch out the key differences between the American and
German approaches to competition and employer coordination, and the
downstream consequences for employer organization, and ultimately for
organized labor and the political economy as a whole.
III
THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES
One of the most consequential legacies of judicial politics in the United States
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was to actively disarticulate
emerging efforts at employer coordination, especially among small and mediumsized firms, and to confound efforts to develop the kinds of capacities that were
emerging at this time in Europe’s coordinated market economies.
Economic historian Naomi Lamoreaux’s pathbreaking study of the American
merger movement captures the realities of the economic context that American
manufacturers confronted in the late nineteenth century.69 In the face of intense
price competition, firms frequently sought to organize among themselves “to
relieve downward pressure on prices by restricting output and to distribute the
costs of this curtailment evenly across the industry.”70 Such efforts, however,
suffered repeated breakdowns, as members opportunistically broke rank to shore
up their own position.71 These conditions, she argues, were what drove the “great
merger movement,” as companies sought relief through mergers that provided
refuge from the ravages of hyper competition and overproduction. Thousands of
smaller producers vanished as they were subsumed by big corporations in this
period.72
Lamoreaux’s account provides an enormously important corrective to the
conventional wisdom, which is, for example, classically articulated by Pulitzer
Prize winning Professor of Business History Alfred Chandler.73 Economic
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

RICHTER, supra note 54, at 208.
Id.
Id. at 208 (translating the original text).
See generally LAMOREAUX, supra note 45.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 14–16, 25.
Id. at 1–2.
See ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 1 (1977) (arguing that “modern business enterprise” became the dominant force
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distress, not the promise of greater efficiency, provided the main impetus for
many of the mergers of this period.74 For our purposes, however, Lamoreaux’s
otherwise masterful study suffers two shortcomings. The first is an overemphasis
on the uniqueness of the American situation. She attributes the merger
movement to “a particular conjunction of circumstances” in the United States in
the 1890s that gave rise to “abnormally serious price wars” and that pushed huge
numbers of firms toward horizontal mergers.75 However, as noted at the outset,
the situation faced by American manufacturers in this period was far from
unique. Germany, Britain, and indeed most of Europe, were suffering similar
woes, though with quite different consequences.
Second, and more importantly, Lamoreaux’s analysis misses important
swathes of American manufacturing. Her analysis distinguishes very broadly
between specialty producers of high-quality goods, on one hand, and mass
producers of homogenous products, on the other.76 Lamoreaux pays only fleeting
attention to the former. They drop out of her analysis because she assumes that
they were not vulnerable to price competition in the first place and because
“production [could be] adjusted easily to fluctuations in market demand.”77 Her
analysis then focuses almost entirely on large consolidations where at least five
companies merged and draws many of its conclusions from the experiences of
capital-intensive industries engaged in mass production.78 This broad dichotomy,
however, overlooks enormous parts of American industry, including sectors that
would be crucial to the evolution of industrial relations—above all, batch
producers, especially in the machine and metalworking industries, which relied
heavily on skilled labor.79
Such producers did suffer intense and destructive competition, but the
response of these firms—many of them small and medium-sized family-owned
firms—was not necessarily mergers, but instead often collective bargaining.80
Thomas Klug’s observation that “[t]he golden age of trade agreements between
1897 and 1904 coincided with the great merger movement in American business”

in the market, bringing with it “managerial capitalism,” rather than the market being controlled by an
“invisible hand of market forces”).
74. LAMOREAUX, supra note 45, at 114.
75. Id. at 12.
76. Id. at 15.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 30–31, 46–86 (discussing the impact of capital intensity in fueling price wars and
ultimately consolidation).
79. As one indicator, Lamoreaux’s study does not include any references to unions or skill. See id.
80. See, e.g., Thomas A. Klug, The Roots of the Open Shop: Employers, Trade Unions, and Craft
Labor Markets in Detroit, 1859–1907 at 392–97 (Feb. 25, 1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Wayne
State University) (on file with author). Some such producers did merge: for example, the Detroit railway
car companies joined with producers elsewhere in 1899, forming the American Car and Foundry
Company. Id. at 55. And some trusts continued to bargain with unions, for example the Glass Trust,
which “deliberately unioniz[ed] all the establishments under its control.” Mabel Atkinson, Trusts and
Trade Unions, 19 POL. SCI. Q. 193, 197–98 (1904).
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is no coincidence.81 This period saw a proliferation of employer associations of
various sorts, including what Clarence Bonnett calls “negotiatory” associations
that relied on unions to encourage employer organization and police firm
behavior.82
Most of these firms were not particularly capital intensive, relying instead on
general purpose machinery operated by skilled workers. Thus, what united the
firms that turned to collective bargaining in this period was a heavy reliance on
skilled labor whose wages made up a large part of total production costs.83 For
example, machine tool producers in the East and Midwest were all engaged in
such skill-intensive production and sought to confront market turbulence by
fostering cooperation on wages with their workers and on pricing with each
other—efforts that led to the 1902 founding of the National Machine Tool
Builders Association (NMTBA).84 By the end of the nineteenth century, trade
agreements had been struck in a number of sectors, allowing skilled unions to
gain an unprecedented foothold in the labor market in the 1890s.85
Detroit, an important hub of machine production in the nineteenth century,
provides an example of how unions became a key part of the labor market.
Detroit’s machine and metalworking firms experienced repeated, devastating
boom and bust cycles, and suffered problems of overcapacity and destructive
price wars between 1871 and 1904.86 The stove industry was especially vulnerable
to these cycles, and therefore employers in this industry organized themselves
into the Stove Founders National Defense Association (SFNDA) to stabilize
competition through voluntary cooperation.87 The SFNDA initially rejected
negotiating with organized labor, but after repeated unsuccessful efforts to
coordinate among themselves, they turned to the Iron Molders Union (IMU),
striking a broad and encompassing collective bargaining agreement to
standardize wages across firms.88 The IMU could monitor wages and punish firms
that broke out of the deal by depriving them of the skilled labor on which their
production relied. Thus, starting in 1891 the IMU “was able to play a major role
81. Klug, supra note 80, at 547.
82. Bonnett contrasts these to the “belligerent” employers of the period, who have received the
lion’s share of attention in the literature. See CLARENCE BONNETT, EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF TYPICAL ASSOCIATIONS 22–25 (1922).
83. See Atkinson, supra note 80, at 223 (“[I]n industries where the labor is unskilled and the wages
are low, if the trust appears before the trade union, then combination among the capitalists makes
organization among the workers more difficult and lessens their power of resisting unwise or unjust
demands.”); see also id. at 214–15, 217.
84. Gary Herrigel, Industry as a Form of Order: A Comparison of the Historical Development of the
Machine Tool Industries in the United States and Germany, in GOVERNING CAPITALIST ECONOMIES:
PERFORMANCE AND CONTROL OF ECONOMIC SECTORS 97, 107 (J. Rogers Hollinsworth, Philippe C.
Schmitter & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1994).
85. Klug, supra note 80, at 243, 505.
86. See id. at 426–98 (describing the cycles of nineteenth and early twentieth century industry in
Detroit and their effect on labor and labor disputes).
87. See id. at 7.
88. Id. at 471; see id. at 482 (“Unable to bring order and restore profitability to the stove industry
by themselves, employers turned to the Iron Molders Union to do it for them.”).
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in rescuing stove manufacturers from destructive competition and falling
profits.”89
John Bowman’s study of the bituminous coal industry provides a striking
portrait of another such industry needing union support.90 Beginning in the 1890s,
producers of bituminous coal had entered into sweeping interstate wage contracts
with miners “in the hope that the union would organize capitalist competition by
preventing the self-destructive wage and price competition generated by
competitive relations.”91 Bowman emphasized that such arrangements were by
no means always foisted upon unwilling capitalists, but instead were
“accepted . . . [by them] to protect themselves from the economic behavior of
other capitalists.”92 Indeed, in some cases, employers actively supported the
unionization campaign of the United Mine Workers.93
Such arrangements were endorsed and vigorously promoted by an
overarching National Civic Federation (NCF) composed of representatives of
both unions and employers that was dedicated to promoting collective
bargaining.94 One of the architects of the NCF was Marcus Alonzo Hanna, a
“supremely successful industrialist, shipper, and banker” from Ohio who was also
chairman of the National Republican Committee from 1896 to 1904.95 In his home
state of Ohio, Hanna had spearheaded the creation of an association of coal
operators in the 1870s that worked with unions to stabilize the “anarchically
competitive industry,” and from his perch in the NCF he sought to disseminate
that model.96 Between 1895 and 1905, “19 employers’ associations and 16 unions
had negotiated no fewer than 26 national or large district agreements,” and in
almost every case, “[m]anufacturers’ desire for market control of chaotic price
competition” brought them together with unions to enforce wage floors and in
this way inhibited “the outbreak of disruptive price wars.”97
The fate of these arrangements, however, was powerfully shaped by the
prevailing legal regime, which allowed employers who were disadvantaged by
such arrangements to seek relief in the courts. A key player in this was the
American Anti-Boycott Association (AABA), a network of lawyers who
specialized in assisting firms in fighting unions, including by disrupting existing
arrangements that employers had negotiated with labor in efforts to attain
market stability.98 The AABA was decidedly not an employer or trade

89. Id. at 7.
90. John R. Bowman, When Workers Organize Capitalists: The Case of the Bituminous Coal
Industry, 14 POL. & SOC’Y 289 (1985).
91. Id. at 290.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 296.
94. BONNETT, supra note 82, at 386, 389–91.
95. SWENSON, supra note 32, at 144.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 49.
98. See generally ERNST, supra note 34. In a 1989 Iowa Law Review article, Ernst characterized the
AABA as “a legal defense fund sustained by the contributions of proprietors of small firms who faced
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association, and required virtually nothing in the way of organization or
coordination on the part of client firms. It set itself up as a general purpose
organization, offering services to firms from all sectors. As such, it was an explicit
alternative to employer and trade associations such as the NMTBA or the
NSFDA, whose membership and services were industry- or region-specific.
The AABA’s mission was more expansive than that of these other
associations: its express purpose was to shape the authoritative interpretation of
particular laws by seeking to secure court decisions whose precedent-setting
impact would resonate far beyond individual sectors or regions.99 Above all, the
organization sought out cases that would establish that unions too were subject
to antitrust provisions in the Sherman Act, and to establish that an individual’s
right to work was to be protected just as vigorously as a business person’s right
to run his own business.
The identity of the companies that belonged to the AABA was confidential,
but their dues financed the provision of the association’s benefits and services—
legal advice and sometimes direct legal representation and court costs.100 The
organization operated in a highly disciplined and strategic way, carefully
choosing the cases to take up.101 Thus, the AABA declined to take up weak cases
that they thought would not promote its agenda, and actively pursued cases that
they saw as capable of establishing desirable new precedents.102 As founder
Daniel Davenport emphasized, individual companies were not in a position to
fight the legal battles necessary to secure favorable decisions.103 Instead, as Ernst
put it, “what was needed was an organization to spread the costs of suing trade
unions and developing legal experience on the labor problem, and this was what
the AABA would provide.”104
The AABA was wildly successful, winning every one of the cases it took on
in its first five years.105 Perhaps the most prominent among these was the
landmark Danbury Hatters case, Loewe v. Lawlor,106 which extended the
application of antitrust laws to labor unions—a decision that effectively

many of the nation’s strongest unions.” Daniel R. Ernst, The Labor Exemption, 1908–1914, 74 IOWA L.
REV. 1151, 1151 (1989). For more on the AABA (later renamed the League for Industrial Rights), see
generally BONNETT, supra note 82, at 449–74.
99. Daniel R. Ernst, The Lawyers and the Labor Trust: A History of the American Anti-Boycott
Association, 1902–1919 at 68–69 (June 1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on
file with author).
100. Id. at 69–70, 75. Due to the AABA’s confidentiality policy, exact membership figures do not
exist, but it was estimated to have about 1,000 members in 1915, and up to 2,000 by 1921. See BONNETT,
supra note 82, at 449.
101. Ernst, supra note 99, at 69.
102. Id.
103. ERNST, supra note 34, at 50.
104. Id.
105. Ernst, supra note 99, at 69. See also BONNETT, supra note 82, at 458–62 (providing an overview
of the cases in which the AABA, later the League for Industrial Rights, participated).
106. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
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precluded the development of industrial unionism in the United States.107 The
conflict emerged in the context of a campaign by the United Hatters of North
America, in an industry that was a typical case of regulatory unionism. The hat
trade was dominated by small producers who collectively sought to contain the
disruptive influence of low-quality, low-grade competitors.108 After a failed
attempt to form a holding company, employers had turned to the United Hatters
Union to help them bring order to the market.109
The Danbury Hatters case challenged the efforts of the Hatters to enforce the
employment of unionized workers in the industry. The case was brought by D. E.
Loewe & Company, a low-wage, marginal producer of “soft” hats, seeking to
avoid the strictures of the industry bargain and escape union influence. The
AABA saw great promise in pursuing the case and, in the proceedings, made
clear that this was not a struggle between “a man and the working people,” an
unpopular position with many juries, but instead between one manufacturer and
an unholy alliance between his competitors conspiring with a powerful national
union.110 Although the decision fell short of the AABA’s initial goal of outlawing
the closed shop, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “combinations which are
composed of laborers acting in the interest of laborers” can be combinations in
restraint of trade under the Sherman Act.111
The impact of the Danbury Hatters case resonated widely. Proprietary
capitalists who before 1890 had not thought to turn to courts had come to realize
how the judiciary could work for them.112 Promoting the courts as a key arena for
doing battle with unions, the AABA (later rebranded The League for Industrial
Rights) began publishing a journal called Law and Labor to educate and inform
employers of the latest legal developments.113 The organization thus established
itself as a “clearing house on all legal and constitutional phases of the labor
problem.”114 It is no coincidence that sectoral employer and trade associations
such as the National Metal Trades Association (NMTA), the National Founders
Association (NFA), and the National Erectors Association (NEA), which had
been organized to facilitate collective bargaining, turned belligerent towards
unions between 1901 and 1906.115
Shortly before Davenport’s appearance at the National Association of
Manufacturers’ (NAM) national convention, NAM too had abandoned its
earlier, more cooperative strategy in order to launch its famous “open shop”
107. ERNST, supra note 34, at 13–19.
108. See id. at 13 (describing the “unintelligent competition” of “lower, profitless grades” of hats).
109. Id. at 13–14.
110. Ernst, supra note 99, at 160.
111. Loewe, 208 U.S. at 302.
112. ERNST, supra note 34, at 55.
113. WALTER GORDON MERRITT, HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE FOR INDUSTRIAL RIGHTS 96–99
(1925).
114. BONNETT, supra note 82, at 449.
115. See id. at 63, 65, 69–71, 98, 101–05, 117–18, 131–33, 137–41 (describing the purpose and actions
of each of these organizations during the early twentieth century).
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campaign against labor.116 As NAM’s president David Parry put it in his 1903
report to the membership:
It is true that the fight against organized labor is, in a measure, a departure from our
former conservative policy respecting labor, but it is an inevitable departure if the
Association hopes to continue to fill the full measure of its possible usefulness to the
manufacturers and people of the country.117

In NAM’s Declaration of Principles, courts and the judiciary now figured
prominently as an important forum for advancing its objectives.
Throughout the open shop movement, NAM worked hand-in-glove with the
AABA. The relationship between the two organizations was sealed in the context
of another important court case, one that took direct aim at the cooperative
arrangements between the SFNDA and the IMU in the stove industry discussed
above. While “[m]ost of the leading stove manufacturers applauded [the
cooperative agreements] for banishing ‘unfair’ competition,”118 one employer
who chafed under the strictures of the deal was James van Cleave, President of
Buck’s Stove and Range Company, who became president of NAM in 1906.119
Spoiling for a fight to rally companies to the newly-embraced open shop cause,
Van Cleave turned to the AABA to fight the case, which ultimately resulted in
another major assault on unions in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. in 1911
and solidified the partnership between NAM and the AABA.120
This was not van Cleave’s first attack against unions: in 1907 van Cleave
oversaw the establishment of a National Council for Industrial Defense whose
purpose was “to focus all manufacturing power, local and national, on behalf of
mutual interests in general, but particularly with respect to legislation bearing
upon the labor question.”121 NAM also worked with local employers’ associations
such as that in Detroit, which was an important center for the machine industry
and which became an epicenter in conflicts over the open shop.122 Thus, the
116. William Phillip Saunders, Jr., The Political Dimension of Labor-Management Relations:
National Trends and State Level Developments in Massachusetts 138–39 (June 24, 1964) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with author).
117. Id. at 139.
118. ERNST, supra note 34, at 126.
119. Id. at 125–26; Ashley Williams, Who’s Who. . .NAM President James Van Cleave, HAGLEY (Nov.
20, 2017), https://www.hagley.org/research/programs/nam-project-news/who’s-who. . .nam-presidentjames-van-cleave%E2%80%8B [https://perma.cc/C3Y7-DHLJ].
120. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 436, 449–52 (1911) (reviewing a lower
court decision involving an injunction application against individuals boycotting Bucks’ products, who
were then held in contempt of court; the case was dismissed on procedural grounds); BONNETT, supra
note 82, at 459–60 (“While the union leaders thus escaped punishment under the laws relating to boycotts
and violation of injunctions, the laws remained unchanged, in fact, were strongly asserted in decisions
rendered in the course of the case through the courts.”); ERNST, supra note 34, at 124–46 (detailing the
individuals and rationales behind the case and its effects).
121. ROBERT A. BRADY, BUSINESS AS A SYSTEM OF POWER 201 (1943).
122. See Klug, supra note 80, at 788–837. See STEPHEN MEYER III, THE FIVE DOLLAR DAY: LABOR
MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 1908–1921, at 89 (1981)
(“After 1902, Detroit was the ‘open shop’ city par excellence. At the time the Detroit Employers’
Association waged ‘a vigorous fight against the various unions in the metal industry’ and completely
defeated the traditionally strong unions in the metal trades . . . . Until about 1912, the Employers’
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Employers’ Association of Detroit (EAD) worked with local firms to assist them
in their battles with labor, and sometimes picked up the tab for their legal
expenses.123 Among the services the EAD provided to its members was aiding
them in securing labor injunctions, which had become “the most important legal
weapon of employers” since the Pullman strike of 1894.124 Once an employer had
secured an injunction, the EAD also helped them enforce it, rounding up
affidavits from people who would testify to having witnessed threats and hiring
undercover men with cameras to “amass evidence that could be used in court.”125
As the EAD’s general counsel, George F. Monaghan, put it: “Your courts are
your greatest protection.”126 The role of the injunction in defeating the efforts of
early class-based unions is well-documented.
In sum, the successes of these organizations, and the strategic use of the law
by some firms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, disrupted
emerging strategies of collective self-help among firms and nascent multiemployer bargaining arrangements with labor. From a comparative perspective,
the important point is that the strategies that these organizations developed and
perfected for waging legal battles further reduced incentives to develop the kind
of coordinating capacities that were being developed in Europe. The prevailing
U.S. antitrust regime put all forms of coordination among independent firms on
tenuous legal ground, and unions that worked with employers to mitigate
destructive competition through bargaining over wages and skills found
themselves on the receiving—and losing—end of antitrust suits.127 In this period,
budding forms of collective multi-firm coordination—both among employers and
between labor and capital—withered as organizations such as the AABA
encouraged them instead to mobilize the courts in battles that focused on the
individual rights of firms and workers. Under these circumstances, there was little
need or incentive for employers to construct strong associations, for, as one
employer at the time remarked (with reference to the AABA), “we are getting
more for our money out of this Association than any other.”128

Association’s position towards organized labor prevailed, and Detroit had few successful strikes in its
automobile shops and factories.”).
123. Klug, supra note 80, at 727, 887.
124. Id. at 821. In Michigan, the case that set the precedent for the use of the injunction was Beck v.
Railway Teamsters Protective Union in 1898, which held that the union’s picketing amounted to unlawful
intimidation. 118 Mich. 497, 529 (1898); Klug, supra note 80, at 821–23.
125. Klug, supra note 80, at 827–28.
126. Id. at 820–21.
127. As Crane pointed out, only one of the first thirteen successful antitrust cases involved a
combination of capitalists; in all other cases it was labor combinations that were found in violation of
antitrust law. Daniel A. Crane, The Dissociation of Incorporation and Regulation in the Progressive Era
and the New Deal, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 109, 115 (Naomi Lamoreaux &
William J. Novak eds., 2017).
128. Ernst, supra note 99, at 83.
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IV
THE GERMAN CASE
The legal status of cartels in Germany in the late nineteenth century was the
mirror image of that in the United States. While the U.S. Supreme Court shaped
competition policy through its interpretations of the Sherman Act, Germany’s
supreme court, the Reichsgericht, exercised direct influence through rulings it was
called upon to make in the absence of similar legislation.129 In the same year the
Sherman Act was passed, the Reichsgericht ruled that businesses were allowed to
regulate markets by engaging in “self-help on a cooperative basis” in order to
prevent disruptive hyper-competition.130
Eighty-seven wood pulp producers in Saxony acted in just such a manner
when they organized themselves in 1893 as a price cartel to protect themselves
against pernicious competition.131 The Saxony Wood Pulp Producers Association
(Sächsische Holzstoff-Fabrikanten-Verband) established a common sales agency
through which all members would sell at the same “reasonable” price.132 The
courts were drawn in when a member went outside this arrangement in 1894 and
1895 and sought relief from the penalties imposed by the cartel.133 The court
found for the cartel, and indeed went further, by creating “a strong presumption”
in favor of such arrangements as a justified measure in the interests of self-help.134
Specifically, the court decision “assumed crisis protection to be the likely purpose
of any cartel” and held that these agreements only stepped outside the bounds of
the law when their purpose was either to create a monopoly or to exploit
consumers, or where such monopoly or exploitation actually resulted from such
cartels.135 With that, German courts signaled that they would be willing to
intervene only in extreme cases, declaring cartels and syndicates to be “especially

129. See RICHTER, supra note 54, at 60.
130. Nörr, supra note 48, at 7. Germans followed developments in the United States closely. An 1894
essay by Ernst Levy von Halle (presented at the 1895 convention of the Verein), entitled “Kartelle in
Deutschland und im Auslande” described American antitrust law in detail and concluded that the
American law was not effective in defeating the trusts and if anything had simply resulted in old trusts
being converted to new forms (through merger and acquisition). According to Richter, the essay had a
profound effect on the German discussion, promoting the idea that it would be more effective to allow—
but then regulate—cartels. RICHTER, supra note 54, at 181.
131. Id. at 57.
132. Id. at 72.
133. The Wood Pulp association was formed as a syndicate, in which all members agreed to sell
exclusively through a joint sales arrangement. The penalty for violations was thirty marks per dry ton of
wood pulp. The case was brought by a pulp producer who sold outside the syndicate and refused to pay
the fine, and argued that the cartel contract violated the principle of freedom of association
(Gewerbefreiheit). Id. at 71–72.
134. William R. Cornish, Legal Control over Cartels and Monopolization 1880–1914: A Comparison,
in LAW AND THE FORMATION OF THE BIG ENTERPRISES IN THE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURIES 280,
300 (Norbert Horn & Jürgen Kocka eds., 1979).
135. Id.
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suited” to serve the economy by protecting against inefficient loss-generating
overproduction and the associated “catastrophes.”136
As in the United States, the economic turbulence of the 1870s and 1880s had
prompted the formation of various sorts of cooperative arrangements, and the
1897 ruling by the German court in favor of cartels in the Wood Pulp Producers
Association case was important for putting these arrangements on solid legal
footing. Thus, cartels in Germany—already growing before the court’s decision—
expanded rapidly after their legal status was clarified. Although the exact number
of cartels is uncertain, figures reported by the German Interior Ministry suggest
that there were 385 by 1902 and over 500 by 1918.137
Despite the consensus in academic and legal circles, the growing influence of
massive concentrations of economic power in key infrastructural industries
generated discontent among firms that relied on these inputs, as well as unease
in the population at large, who saw in these cartels an effort to fleece consumers
in the name of higher profits.138 When a sharp increase in coal prices in 1900 and
1901 heightened such concerns, the state reluctantly yielded to this pressure and
appointed a commission to investigate the price-raising behavior and effects of
the cartels. The Verein debated the issue vigorously at its 1905 convention, but
the prevailing view remained that cartels could serve as a bulwark both against
the growth of large U.S.-style trusts, while also protecting against the “ravages of
hyper-individualism.”139 Conference chair Karl Rathgen summarized the results
of the Verein’s rather inconclusive twelve-hour debate by saying that though
“cartels are a necessary part of economic development . . . in light of their
proliferation . . . the state should do something. However, it is not possible to
forge a unified position out of the diversity of proposals [that had emerged from
the discussion].”140
When the results of the government commission were finally revealed, the
outcome was not the one anticipated by the critics.141 The commission’s report
did not call for major changes, and instead reaffirmed that cartels served the
collective interests of society.142 In the end, Germany did not pass a cartel law
until much later, in 1923, and when it did, the “decree concerning abuses of
economic power” did not prohibit cartels.143 It did establish new oversight

136. JOCHEN MOHR, SICHERUNG DER VERTRAGSFREIHEIT DURCH WETTBEWERBS—UND
REGULIERUNGSRECHT 151 (2015) (translating the original text).
137. OTTO POLYSIUS, VERBANDSBESTREBUNGEN IM DEUTSCHEN MASCHINENBAU 20 (1921).
138. Id. at 4.
139. RICHTER, supra note 54, at 207–10; Nörr, supra note 48, at 7.
140. RICHTER, supra note 54, at 209–10.
141. POLYSIUS, supra note 137, at 4.
142. Id.
143. Gregory Jackson, The Origins of Nonliberal Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan, in
THE ORIGINS OF NONLIBERAL CAPITALISM: GERMANY AND JAPAN IN COMPARISON 121, 135
(Wolfgang Streeck & Kozo Yamamura eds., 2001); see also Wilfried Feldenkirchen, Competition Policy
in Germany, 21 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 257, 259 (1992).
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mechanisms, notably through the creation of a cartel court.144 But the court’s
purpose was not to suppress cartels, and its functions mostly revolved around
adjudicating disputes that arose among cartel members, or between cartel
members and outsiders.145
Like their American counterparts, small, skill-dependent firms in Germany
had also responded to market turbulence through cooperative arrangements to
stabilize the market, but they did so in this radically different legal context. The
solutions they devised drew on older traditions in which small, regionally-based
producers solved their collective action problems through governance
arrangements among firms; these arrangements were managed by trade
associations and sometimes policed by unions.146 These firms and regions have
received far less attention than the large autarkic firms and cartels of the late
nineteenth century, but they were actually the early core of German
industrialization and the site of a very different industrial order.147
The hub of much of this activity was the decentralized industrial districts of
the southwest in Württemberg, Saxony, and the Bergisches Land south of the
Ruhr.148 Faced with intense market volatility, these firms banded together to
socialize risks and reduce uncertainty by coordinating—on wages, on production
strategies, on technology, on training—not to eliminate but to manage
competition among themselves in the market.149 Their efforts at cooperative selfhelp were smiled upon by the national government, and were often also actively
facilitated by their own local and regional governments.150
Depending on the character of the industry, these firms organized different
types of cooperative arrangements to address the particular kinds of competitive
challenges they faced, either on a formal or, very often, more informal basis.151
Thus, for example, in industries like cotton textile finishing and cutlery in which
the main production cost was labor, price cartels operated to dampen cutthroat
competition in downturns.152 In other sectors, such as the textile trades, termfixing cartels established shared guidelines for payment and delivery schedules,
thus preventing firms from “destroying one another by attempting to gain orders
by offering to perform services on increasingly unreasonable terms.”153 In the
machinery and other capital-goods producing industries, specialization cartels—
144. Jackson, supra note 143, at 135.
145. William C. Kessler, German Cartel Regulation Under the Decree of 1923, 50 Q.J. ECON. 680,
681–82 (1936).
146. See HERRIGEL, supra note 12, at 33–71.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 166.
149. Id. at 59–65.
150. See Hal Hansen, Caps and Gowns: Historical Reflections on the Institutions that Shaped
Learning for and at Work in Germany and the United States, 1800–1945, at 194–95 (1997) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with author) (discussing state promotion
of such arrangements in Germany’s southwestern states).
151. HERRIGEL, supra note 12, at 60–65.
152. Id. at 61–62.
153. Id. at 62.
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also known as finishing associations—involved arrangements in which member
firms “agreed to specialize in one or several lines of a product (for example,
particular machine tool types, such as lathes) while ceding other lines to other
members of the association.”154
Through such arrangements, these producers sought to protect themselves
against customers (including state contractors) who sought to engage them in
destructive bidding wars.155 For example, potential buyers sometimes imposed
harsh terms of delivery or payment, to which firms would have to agree in order
to win the contract. In other cases, clients would award the contract to the lowest
bidder but then ask the firm to perform the work according to the plan that had
been put forth by some other firm for a higher bid. Furthermore, since company
bids for contracts often included detailed production plans, firms were constantly
exposed to the threat of intellectual property theft. Individual firms on their own
were powerless to fight these practices. Such problems, as Otto Polysius
emphasized, could only be overcome through collective organization.156
Whatever their form, these arrangements—many of which would have been
illegal under the prevailing legal regime in the United States—served to stabilize
competition in the face of turbulence.157 More than this, these arrangements also
provided a space within which it was safe for member firms to contribute to
building and maintaining complementary institutions of collective self-help that
would benefit all of them.158 Thus, these regions developed or preserved
institutions designed to support cooperation in other areas as well. These
included vocational schools to promote ongoing skill formation and to cultivate
and expand the skill base of the local work force—the opposite of the deskilling
strategies taking hold in the United States at this time.159 They also included
technical institutes, often with support from the state government, to disseminate
the latest know-how and to promote ongoing adaptation to the latest
technological developments.160 Finally, they included cooperative financial
arrangements to assist firms in securing investment capital for growth and
innovation, as well as arrangements for shared standard-setting and help to firms
in bringing their diverse products to broader (also world) markets.161
The political-economic ecosystem in these regions allowed small firms to
avoid destructive price wars and also encouraged them to collectively move upmarket into higher value-added market segments. The powerful German
154. Id. at 63.
155. POLYSIUS, supra note 137, at 64.
156. Id.
157. HERRIGEL, supra note 12, at 59–65.
158. Id.
159. See Hansen, supra note 150, at 180–96 (“In the long run . . . Germans gradually built a
comprehensive system of industrial, commercial, and craft education and training, while Americans
turned increasingly to a combination of work rationalization strategies and on-the-job training in the
workplace, supplemented by a culturally oriented academic curriculum in full-time schools.”).
160. See id.
161. See id.
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Mechanical Engineering Association (VDMA) grew out of one such regional
association that had originally been founded in 1890 to improve delivery and
payment conditions, resist unreasonable demands of customers, and establish
reasonable prices.162 The VDMA saw its main task as eliminating abuses that
caused “unhealthy” competition.163 To that end, it sought to promote accurate
cost-accounting among firms, establish unitary delivery and payment conditions,
and develop collective strategies to protect proprietary drawings and ideas.164
When Friedrich Fröhlich took over as managing director of VDMA in 1910, he
continued the VDMA’s emphasis on quality over price; in his words, “[b]etter
expensive and good than cheap and bad.”165
As in the United States, large cartels in Germany fought against unions
furiously and very successfully, but these smaller manufacturing firms that were
engaged in skill-intensive specialized production found it necessary to maintain
cordial relations with the skilled workers on whom they relied.166 Indeed, their
dependence on skilled labor grew as competition came to center on product
quality rather than price. Thus, the regions in which these cooperative
arrangements among small independent proprietors flourished were more
congenial to union organizing, and formed the heart of the German labor
movement in the late nineteenth century. Unions in these areas organized and
bargained for a far larger share of the workforce than in the centers of heavy
industry in the Ruhr Valley. As Klaus Schönhoven noted, in 1913, fully threequarters of all German workers who were covered by collective agreements were
employed in small and medium-sized firms with fifty or fewer employees.167
Like their American counterparts, the unions in these areas were
overwhelmingly organized along craft lines, and represented different ideological
leanings (Catholic, Marxian social democratic, or Lassallean-socialist, depending
in part on the region).168 However, while their counterparts in the United States
would find themselves caught in the cross-fire between high- and low-end
employers, skilled unions in Germany’s decentralized industrial districts shared
with employers a strong interest in increasing and expanding the supply of skills

162. POLYSIUS, supra note 137, at 65–74.
163. Id. at 75.
164. Id. at 75–77. In one industry, competitors banded together to share licenses for production
technologies among themselves, both to avoid the costs of litigation among themselves over patents and
to collectively bear the legal costs of defending their patents against outsiders. Id. at 133.
165. Id. at 74 (translating the original text).
166. ELISABETH HARNISCH, DIE KARTELLIERUNGSFÄHIGKEIT DER MASCHINENINDUSTRIE 56
(1917) (noting that a 1917 survey by the VDMA found that an average of 25% of total value of their
members’ production went into wages—in some industry segments up to 30% to 35%).
167. Schönhoven, supra note 16, at 416.
168. Early unions in Germany, as in the United States, were overwhelmingly composed of skilled
workers with distinct occupational/craft identities. This was certainly true in the critical 1880s and 1890s
but it continued through the pre-World War I period. Thus, for example, in 1913, fully 80% of the
members of the first—and largest—industrial union of the day (the German Metalworkers’ Union) were
skilled craftsmen who had served an apprenticeship. Id. at 411.
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on which the regional economy depended.169 Regional training institutions
actively supported the ongoing upgrading of worker skills and adaptation to the
latest technical developments.170 Because these arrangements were organized
collectively, they also promoted skill portability across the regional labor market,
facilitating the movement of workers across firms and related industries.171 In this
way, they supported multi-firm bargaining and encouraged the development of
encompassing labor organizations.172 In this context, multi-employer collective
bargaining served as a further framework for socializing risk across firms by
standardizing wages, thus reducing costly competition among employers for
skilled labor. Unions in Germany’s decentralized industrial order were thus part
of a broader ecosystem of coordination and one that was not experienced by
member firms as constraining, but instead as deeply enabling.
The arrangements for cooperative self-help forged in this period survived the
First World War, as well as the transition to democracy and the incorporation of
labor under the first social democratic government of the Weimar Republic.173
Indeed, as Nörr pointed out, the cartel idea if anything “received a boost” with
the constitutional charter of 1919, which embraced the idea of a collectively
governed economy as an alternative to both laissez-faire and direct state
control.174 With the transition to democracy, the views of influential social
democrats, including the great Marxist theorist and Minister of Finance Rudolf
Hilferding, shifted considerably.175 Hilferding, who before the war had authored
a scathing critique of economic concentration,176 came to view a high level of
employer organization as an important tool for the political management of
capitalism.177

169. See KATHLEEN THELEN, HOW INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY SKILLS IN
GERMANY, BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND JAPAN 39–42 (2004) (noting that unions were generally
supportive of employers’ training efforts, and that the machine industry in particular heavily relied on
skilled labor and thus premier firms worked to create a system providing training).
170. See id. at 45–46.
171. See id. at 19.
172. Germany’s industrial unions grew by absorbing organizations of skilled workers into
overarching organizations while also protecting their distinct craft identities. The largest industrial union,
the German Metalworkers Union negotiated completely separate agreements for the various
occupations in this period. See id. at 49–50.
173. Nörr, supra note 48, at 9.
174. Id.; see also WERNHARD MÖSCHEL, RECHT DER WETTBEWERBSBESCHRÄNKUNGEN 19 (1983)
(highlighting that by the end of the Weimar period Germany had somewhere between two and four
thousand cartels “of varying importance”).
175. The issue of the cartels was long contested in social democratic circles. Some party members
were vehement critics of the overweening power of capital as it developed in the late nineteenth century.
But there were others who considered industrial concentration to be the next stage of capitalist
development that would hasten the transition to socialism, and they argued against “reactionary” efforts
to forestall or hinder these developments. See Dietmar Petzina, Gewerkschaften und Monopolfrage vor
und während der Weimarer Republik, 20 ARCHIV FÜR SOZIALGESCHICHTE 195, 197 (1980).
176. See generally RUDOLF HILFERDING, DAS FINANZKAPITAL (1910).
177. See Helen Callaghan & Martin Höpner, Changing Ideas: Organised Capitalism and the German
Left, 35 WEST EUR. POL. 551, 558 (2012).
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V
CONCLUSION
The developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
emphasized in this Article did not, of course, mark the end of the story. But they
did leave an enduring imprint on the subsequent evolution of these two political
economies. The U.S. antitrust regime of the late nineteenth century not only
hastened the growth of large autarkic and mostly anti-labor firms in the great
merger movement. It also played a significant role in disrupting alternative
emerging forms of inter-firm cooperation among smaller, skill-dependent
producers who attempted to defend themselves against the ravages of the market
through collective self-help. The prevailing legal regime in the United States not
only undermined such efforts, it provided a way for low-road producers to use
the courts to disrupt efforts to enlist unions to police and enforce shared rules. In
short, in the United States, what was weeded out—not by the market but by the
courts—were the kinds of strong sectoral organizations and nascent multiemployer bargaining with unions that were taking hold elsewhere, including in
Germany. It is an irony of history that one of the most lasting legacies of the
Sherman Antitrust Act was to clear the way for large dominant producers even
as it wiped out the seeds of these countervailing organizational forces that
elsewhere now serve as a check on the behavior of disruptive new firms with
monopolistic ambitions, an increasingly prevalent part of the American political
economic landscape.178
By contrast, Germany’s very different legal framework facilitated and
supported precisely those forms of coordination that were being dismantled in
the United States. There, the period from the 1870s through the 1890s spawned
a number of new types of economic organization. Beyond the well-known—and
later notorious—large cartels, these also included increasingly vibrant trade
associations. These trade associations were actively involved in managing skill
formation and competition among smaller producers, often in cooperation with
skilled unions organized on an industrial basis. The overall effect was to
encourage the development of a much more elaborate system of mutual support
that stabilized competition in the face of turbulence and preserved a place for the
kind of high quality, high skill, high value-added production for which German
industry came to be known.
The legacy of the late nineteenth century also weighs heavily on the labor
regimes that emerged in the two countries. As we have seen, German

178. See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman & Kathleen Thelen, The Rise of the Platform Business Model and
the Transformation of Twenty-First-Century Capitalism 47 POL. & SOC’Y 177, 177 (2019) (describing the
“distinctive ways US political-economic institutions have facilitated” the emergence of the platform
business model and the rise of many of the large firms associated with it); Kathleen Thelen, Regulating
Uber: The Politics of the Platform Economy in Europe and the United States, 16 PERSP. ON POL. 938
(2018) (using the case of Uber and its arrival in United States, Germany, and Sweden to highlight
differences in the capacity of disruptive new actors like Uber to escape regulation in different politicaleconomic contexts).
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competition policy actively supported collective organization and often
prioritized the interests of the collective over that of the individual firm.179 The
same principle applied on the labor side as well.180 Thus, the German labor regime
came to rest on a separate body of law that is expressly organized around
adjudicating class-based claims. While acknowledging the employer’s right to
manage and a worker’s freedom to join unions, German labor law emphasizes
the primacy of organized labor’s collective rights.181 The basic premise is that
because of the asymmetry in power between the individual worker and his
employer, freedom of contract in the context of the employment relationship
requires the protection of collective rights.182 This core principle has been
enormously important in protecting the status and position of unions in Europe’s
coordinated market economies precisely because it sets limits on what in the
United States would be considered an individual’s contractual freedoms.183
Collective labor law, as Däubler pointed out, is strengthened to the extent that
individual rights can be limited in the interest of the collective.184
Turning to the American case, it is also clear that the 1935 National Labor
Relations Act185 did not mark a great reversal in the evolution of labor relations
in the United States, but if anything represents the culmination of the dynamics
described above. As Forbath has emphasized, the battles over labor’s rights in
the United States were fought in the courts on the (for employers, more
congenial) terrain and in the language of individual rights.186 However, as
Andrias noted, the resulting labor law “settlement” proved to be a very flimsy
179. RICHTER, supra note 54, at 102–04.
180. In the pre-Weimar period, the prevailing civil code viewed the activities of employers and unions
in the same broad light. The balance of political power (Germany was still not a democracy) naturally
tilted outcomes heavily toward employers but tactics—such as boycotts—that were ruled out of bounds
for American unions were legally allowable in Germany. In much the same way that the courts upheld
the rights of employers to cooperate (or collude), German courts saw unions as organizations of collective
self-help engaged in legitimate defense against the free play of market forces. Cf. RAINER SCHRÖDER,
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES KARTELLRECHTS UND DES KOLLEKTIVEN ARBEITSRECHTS DURCH DIE
RECHTSPRECHUNG DES REICHSGERICHTS VOR 1914, at 268–69 (1988).
181. Hugo Sinzheimer wrote what are widely considered the foundational texts. See generally HUGO
SINZHEIMER, EIN ARBEITSTARIFGESETZ: DIE IDEE DER SOZIALEN SELBSTBESTIMMUNG IM RECHT
(1916); HUGO SINZHEIMER, DER KORPORATIVE ARBEITSNORMENVERTRAG (1907); see also OTTO
KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW (1972).
182. Wolfgang Däubler, The Individual and the Collective: No Problem for German Labor Law?, 10
COMP. LAB. L.J. 505, 506–07 (1989); see also BRITTA REHDER, RECHTSPRECHUNG ALS POLITIK (2011).
Many of these are arguments that John R. Commons was pressing in the American context in the 1920s
but that did not prevail.
183. It is the foundation for “extension clauses” in many European countries that shore up union
representation by allowing the government to apply the terms of union contracts to non-union firms and
workers. It is also the basis for so-called “favorability clauses” in collective bargaining laws that explicitly
forbid employers from engaging individual workers or plant labor representatives in concession
bargaining—another huge state-sponsored support for collective labor representation.
184. See Däubler, supra note 182, at 508 (“[A]ssum[ing] that collectivism is successful[, t]he relevant
inquiry then is whether the collective bargaining agreement . . . can limit individual rights.”).
185. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012)) (guaranteeing the right
to unionize and engage in collective bargaining).
186. See FORBATH, supra note 4, at 7.
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foundation for guaranteeing labor’s collective rights.187After the defeat through
disarticulation of the efforts described above to establish industry-wide
bargaining, American employers unified around the pursuit of a deregulatory
agenda that continues to discourage coordination on both sides of the class divide
by centering instead on individual freedom and choice. AABA founder and its
counsel Daniel Davenport summarized the fruits of the AABA’s legal strategies
in the first decade of the twentieth century thus: “The great effort of the Society
has been with the help of the Judiciary, to write into the fabric of American
jurisprudence [the principle of individual liberty].”188 This principle forms the
central theme around which American employers continue to organize—and it
runs like a red thread through the history of American labor relations, from the
open shop movement of the turn of the previous century to the right-to-work
movement today.

187. Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1591, 1610 (2016).
188. BONNETT, supra note 82, at 454.

